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as an opportunity rather than an obligation and pure cost factor
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If a company’s board does not consist of 
more than 50% of independent directors, 
it is interpreted as a sign of bad corporate 
governance since one mechanism to 
control the CEO is potentially weakened.
The separation of ownership and control is a fundamental problem present in all large companies. By giving control over day-to-
day business matters to management, the owners 
of the company (the shareholders) run the risk 
that a company is not managed in a way that is 
consistent with the maximisation of their interest. 
A prominent example of the agency problem is the 
consumption of perquisites by managers. While it 
may be beneficial for a manager to use company 
resources to pay for a lavish office or a company 
aircraft, shareholders would perhaps prefer a 
more productive use of the firm’s resources. There 
are a number of measures that shareholders can 
take to either exert effective control over the man-
agers’ activities or to align management’s inter-
ests with those of shareholders. The combination 
of all these measures is usually subsumed by the 
term “corporate governance”. However beneficial 
better corporate governance may be, its imple-
mentation is often accompanied by considerable 
costs for a firm as evidenced by the costs that 
governance improvements mandated by the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposed, especially on 
smaller firms. It thus remains an empirical ques-
tion whether the implementation of corporate 
governance measures can benefit a company over-
all or the costs outweigh the benefits. The question 
is remarkably timely with many governments 
around the world putting in place more stringent 
corporate governance laws in the wake of the fi-
nancial crisis, most notably the US, where the 
Dodd-Frank Act passed in 2010 includes several 
governance-related items.
Recent evidence on the beneficial effect of 
corporate governance is reported in our paper 
“Corporate Governance and Firm Value: In-
ternational Evidence”, published in the Jour-
nal of Empirical Finance in January 2011. In 
this paper, we investigate whether companies 
that implement better corporate governance 
are rewarded by capital markets by means of 
a higher firm valuation. To construct a mea-
sure of corporate governance on the firm 
level, we use a database compiled by Gover-
nance Metrics International (GMI), which 
assembles information on 64 individual cor-
porate governance attributes for roughly 
2,000 companies from 22 countries for the 
time period from 2003 until 2007. The 64 at-
tributes are classified into six different cate-
gories, namely board accountability, financial 
disclosure and internal control, shareholder 
rights, remuneration, market for control, and 
corporate behaviour. As an example, one at-
tribute in the category “board accountability“ 
indicates if a board consists of more than 50% 
of independent directors. If this is not the 
case, it is interpreted as a sign of bad corpo-
rate governance since one mechanism to con-
trol the CEO is potentially weakened. Com-
bining the 64 individual measures into a cor-
porate governance index, we empirically test 
if companies with a higher governance index 
have a higher firm value. Using many differ-
ent statistical tests, we find a positive effect 
of better corporate governance on firm value. 
Therefore, if a company implements more The positive 
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measures to strengthen the quality of its cor-
porate governance, it can expect a reward by 
capital markets in the form of a higher firm 
valuation. This finding holds for our whole 
time period as well as for individual years and 
also for all sample countries combined as well 
as for the majority of individual countries.
Over the last few years, there has been 
much debate about companies’ corporate so-
cial responsibility. The richness of the GMI 
dataset allows us to investigate whether this 
particular aspect of corporate governance 
also has an effect on firm valuation. As indica-
tors of corporate social responsibility we use 
variables that indicate, for example, if a com-
pany has a policy addressing workplace 
safety, if a company discloses its environmen-
tal performance, or if a company discloses its 
policy regarding corporate level political do-
nations. Combining these attributes to a mea-
sure of corporate social responsibility, we find 
that companies with better corporate social 
responsibility are more highly valued than 
companies with comparatively worse corpo-
rate social responsibility. The value relevance 
of these attributes is also robust to controlling 
for the effect of standard corporate gover-
nance attributes. Moreover, we find that the 
positive valuation effect of corporate social 
responsibility is restricted to firms with a 
good corporate governance structure. Hence, 
good corporate governance seems to assure 
that corporate social responsibility expendi-
tures are profit-oriented rather than serving 
the managers’ personal ambitions, for ex-
ample to improve their reputation as good 
global citizens.
Establishing a statistical relationship be-
tween corporate governance and firm value 
leaves an important question unanswered: 
Does corporate governance actually cause 
higher firm valuations or could it be the case 
that causality runs the other way and more 
highly valued firms implement better corpo-
rate governance? One potential explanation 
for such reverse causality could be that high-
er valued firms are more likely to have the 
financial and managerial resources necessary 
to put better corporate governance in place. 
If such an alternative explanation was true, 
the results of our study would not allow the 
conclusion that firms can actively increase 
their valuation by improving corporate gov-
ernance. In our study, we are able to account 
for this so-called “endogeneity problem” by 
applying various statistical techniques that 
allow us to determine in which direction cau-
sality runs. The results of our statistical tests 
indicate that better corporate governance 
indeed causes higher firm valuations and that 
causality does not run the other way.
Overall, the results of our research suggest 
that it’s always beneficial for a firm to imple-
ment better corporate governance as a means 
to align management’s interest with those of 
shareholders. For the average firm in our 
sample, the costs of implementing corporate 
governance mechanisms seem to be smaller 
than the resulting monitoring benefits. Thus, 
from the companies’ perspective, corporate 
governance should be understood as an op-
portunity rather than an obligation and pure 
cost factor.   
Statistical tests 
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better corporate 
governance 
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Number of nominating/governance committee meetings by top 100 US public companies
During 2009, 85 of the top 100 companies held four or more nominating/governance committee meetings
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Score Company Score
1. Royal Dutch Shell 82.0
2. Bursa Malayasia Berhad 79.0
3. Nexen 79.0
4. Infosys Technologies 78.5
5. Cisco Systems 77.0
6. Life Technologies 77.0
7. Pacific Basin Shipping Limited 76.3
8. Fedex 75.5
9. Novartis 75.5
10. Intel 75.0
Global top 10 in corporate governance
Good governance results in higher firm value
Source: IR Global Rankings
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